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Article 12

CONTROL OF PURCHASERS BY PRE-EMPTI[VE OPTION
By

SAMUEL

A. B. LYONS*

DUE to the need for financially responsible tenants and the personal
desire to have socially compatible neighbors, the condominium cotenants will want some method of controlling who may become an
occupant. It is clear that a reversion' could not be employed for this
purpose, because this interest can exist only where the fee is not
conveyed.3 But suppose a possibility of reverter or right of entry4
were used. For instance, the fee could be conveyed to each purchaser
and his heirs so long as he does not sell, lease, or rent his unit without
the grantor's approval. Similarly, the fee could be conveyed upon
the express condition that such event not happen, and give the grantor
the right to enter and terminate the estate if it did. These conveyances
would create a fee simple determinable and a fee simple upon condition subsequent, 5 respectively, leaving in the grantor a possibility of
reverter or a right of entry.
However, rights of entry and possibilities of reverter can be created
by deed only in the grantor and not in a third party.6 Therefore, problems involving the enforcement of these rights will arise.7 But, even
though this obstacle is overcome, additional problems are involved.
While it is settled that rights of entry and possibilities of reverter

* Member, second year class.
'See Rubens, Right of First Refusal and Waiver of Right to Judicial Partition, 14 HASTINGS L.J.-(1963)

(this issue). See generally Ramsey, Condominium: The New Look in
Co-ops, Nov. 30, 1961. Borgwardt, The Condominium, 36 CAL. S. BAR J. 603 (1961);
Comment, 50 CALIF. L. REv. 299 (1962) ; Comment, 13 HASTINGS L.J. 357 (1962).
2 CAL. CiV. CODE § 768

(Reversion defined);

SIMES & SMITH, FUTURE INTERESTS

§ 81

(1956) ; I AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 4.16 (1952).
'Alamo School Dist. v. Jones, 182 Cal. App. 2d 180, 6 Cal. Rptr. 272 (1960) ; RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY § 154, comments a, c, and d (1936); SIMES & SMITH, FUTURE INTERESTS

§ 82 (1956).
'See generally SIMES & SMITH, FUTURE INTERESTS §§ 241-265, 281-294 (1956); 1
AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY §§ 4.6-4.15 (1952) ; RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY §§ 23, 24 (1936).
See SIMEs & SMITH, FUTURE INTERESTS §§ 247, 286 (1956); 1 AMDIECAN LAW OF
PROPERTY §§ 4.7, 4.13 (1952); RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY §§ 23, 24 (1936).
'Parry v. Berkeley Hall School Foundation, 10 Cal. 2d 422, 74 P.2d 738 (1937) ; SIMES
& SMITH, FUTURE INTERESTS §§ 242, 282 (1956) ; RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY §§ 154, 155 (1936).
See Simes, Restricting Land Use in California by Rights of Entry and Possibilities of
Reverter, 13 HASTINGS L.J. 293, 302-305 (1962).
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are not subject to the Rule Against Perpetuities in the United States,'
those interests may be held invalid as violating the rule against
restraints on alienation.9 Furthermore, it may be held that these interests are not created at all, but merely a covenant1° or a contingent
option."1
Thus, in Alamo School Dist. v. Jones"2 a deed conveying land to

a school district, "Subject, however, to the right of the party of the
first part [grantor] to purchase said land . . . [s]hould same ever
be abandoned for school purposes . . ." was held to create only a

contingent option in the grantor to repurchase. Cases in other jurisdictions also have supported this view. 8
A covenant would also appear unsatisfactory in that it would probably be held void as offending the rule against restraints on alienation.
In Murray v. Green 4 a fee simple was granted with a covenant that
the grantee may not alienate the same without the grantor's consent.
The court held that such a provision was clearly repugnant to the interest created and void as a restraint on alienation.' 5
The Condominium Pre-Emptive Option
The best solution seems to be to give the managing authority of
the condominium a pre-emptive option which arises when one or more
of the occupants wants to sell, lease, or rent his unit. A practical problem then arises: who will be the buyer in such a case? If the option
expires before the managing authority or other buyer is able to raise
the purchase price, the desired control of purchasers would of course
be gone. And the problem might really become acute if more than
one occupant decided to sell at the same time.
Additional problems facing the pre-emptive option are the Rule
'Strong v. Shatto, 45 Cal. App. 29, 187 Pac. 159 (1919); Simms & SmrrH, FuTuRE
INTERESTS §§ 1238-39 (1956) ; 6 AMEmCAN LAw OF PROPERTY § 24.62 (1952) ; RESTATEMENT,

PROPERTY § 372 (1944).

'See Title Guarantee & Trust Co. v. Garrott, 42 Cal. App. 152, 183 Pac. 470 (1919).
See generally 6 A E RCAN LAW OF PROPERTY §§ 26.1-26.132 (1952); Schnebly, Restraints
Upon the Alienation of Legal Interests, 44 Y&r L.J. 961, 1186, 1380 (1935).
10 Victoria Hospital Ass'n v. All Persons, 169 Cal. 455, 147 Pac. 124 (1915).

"1 Alamo
12
Ibid.

School Dist. v. Jones, 182 Cal. App. 2d 180, 6 Cal. Rptr. 272 (1960).

" Bond v. Kennedy, 213 Ark. 758, 212 S.W.2d 336 (1948); Corpier v. Thomason, 155
Ark. 509, 244 S.W. 738 (1922); Gearhart v. West Lumber Co., 212 Ga. 25, 90 S.E.2d 10
(1955) ; Bates v. Bates, 314 Ky. 789, 236 S.W.2d 943 (1961) ; Gange v. Hayes, 193 Ore. 51, 237

P.2d 196 (1951).
1464 Cal. 363, 28 Pac. 118 (1883).
15

CAL. Cry. CODE § 711: Conditions restraining alienation, when repugnant to the

interest created, are void.
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Against Perpetuities and the rule against restraints on alienation. 6
In considering the latter, the social and economic considerations justifying the need for controlling purchasers should not be overlooked.
While no case in point involving a condominium has been litigated,
several cases involving stock co-operatives have upheld similar restrictions on the ground that the utility of the restraint outweighed any
injurious consequences to the public.1" It is recognized that stock cooperative ownership is not fee ownership, and the courts have traditionally been more reluctant to uphold restraints on fees. But the
policy behind the upholding of restraints on stock cooperatives is the
same as with condominiums;" i.e., the success of each project depends
upon the financial stability of the members and the ability of each to
live in harmony with the others. As evidence of the strong public
policy in favor of such control, the Supreme Court of Illinois, in
upholding a comparable restraint, said: "
[T]he agreements show a studied effort on the part of the association to retain some voice in the selection of new members and at the
same time to give its members as much freedom as possible in alienating their interests. .

.

. [I]t would appear that the crucial inquiry

should be directed at the utility of the restraint as compared with the
injurious consequences that flow from its enforcement. If accepted
social and economic considerations dictate that a partial restraint is
reasonably necessary for their fulfillment, such a restraint should be
sustained.
Assuming that the condominium is a lawful and legitimate enterprise, the utility of the pre-emptive option would seem to outweigh any
injurious consequences to the public.2" Further, it is doubtful that the
option involves the dangers associated with restraints on alienation.
Some of these dangers are that restraints keep property out of commerce, they tend to concentrate wealth, they may deter the improvement of the property, and they may prevent creditors from satisfying
their claims. 2 ' But under the pre-emptive option the range of purchasers to which the property can be alienated would seem to be sufliSee Rubens, supra note 1.
"Gale v. York Center Community Co-op, 21 Ill. 2d 86, 171 N.E.2d 30 (1961) ; Swanell
v. Wilson, 400 IlL 138, 79 N.E.2d 26 (1948) ; 68 Beacon St. v. Sohier, 289 Mass. 354, 194 N.E.
303 (1935) Weisner v. 791 Park Ave. Corp., 6 N.Y. 2d 426, 190 N.Y.S.2d 70, 160 N.E.2d
720 (1959); Penthouse Properties v. 1158 5th Ave., 256 App. Div. 685, 11 N.Y.S.2d 417 (1939).
"sComment, 50 CALIF. L. REv. 299, 316 (1962).
"9Gale v. York Center Community Co-op, 21 Ill. 2d 86, 171 N.E.2d 30 (1961).
2 See Comment, 13 HASTINGs L.J. 357, 362-63 (1962); Comment, 50 CALIF. L. REv.
'o

299, 316-17 (1962).
21
See Schnebly, Restraints Upon the Alienation of Legal Interests, 44 YALE L.J. 961,
1186, 1380 (1935).
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ciently broad to keep it in the flow of commerce and prevent a concentration of wealth. Also, the owners would more than likely be
encouraged to improve their homes because the value of any improvement will be realized when they liquidate their interests. Further, the
condominium tenant owns his unit independently from the rest of the
building, and it probably can be mortgaged or levied upon separately.
Therefore it would seem that creditors would not be prevented from
satisfying their claims.
The Constitutional Problem
Since the case of Shelly v. Kraemer2 it has been well settled that
restrictions having as their purpose the exclusion from ownership of
real property of persons of a designated race or color is a denial of
the equal protection of the laws and not to be judicially enforced.
Therefore, if the pre-emptive option were used for a discriminatory
purpose it would not be upheld. However, there is nothing inherent in
the device indicating that this is the situation. The need for some
method of controlling purchasers is supported by legitimate social and
economic considerations. The pre-emptive option is merely the device
employed to bring about this result, and the right to exercise it arises
when any offer to buy is made. Thus, the option would appear to be
valid under this test. 23
Conclusion
A major problem facing the condominium scheme is that of providing some method by which the occupants may approve or disapprove
prospective purchasers. Although not without its problems, the best
means for providing this control is a pre-emptive option which enables
the managing authority to purchase, within a reasonable time, any
unit put up for sale. This device provides a control which in every
way is reasonable and appropriate to the lawful purposes to be obtained.

22

334 U.S. 1 (1948).

"s See Comment, 50 CAr~w. L. REv. 299,317 (1962).

